I scoff at the claim people make concerning the debate between "scientists based on evidence" and creationists often referred to as religious people (which is a wrong term to group these people by the way). During our conversation on Gieryn in class today one of my colleagues made the claim, "well if science is constantly up for debate, what's the difference between creationists’ arguments?" My response: nothing -- and that is why I laugh. One of the things we have failed to mention in our discussions of upstream and downstream work is the human capacity for creation itself. Our methods of measurement, mathematics itself, our ways of finding evidence, our ways of framing and supporting that evidence, and the actual things we investigate (chemical concoctions, etc.) are essentially "made" through the human capacity for creation whether done collectively or individually and with a little word the USA LOVES to use -- autonomous decision making. So wouldn't it be obvious to assume that claims about the world are "made" based on what Kosso has pinpointed -- internal beliefs, previous beliefs about the world, views, morals and standards THROUGH an idea of creationism and/or "science based on evident"? Yes. Why? Because humans, themselves, are very active participants of creationism.
The truth is, God created us in His image so what He does, we essentially have the capacity to do as well -- certainly not on the same scale, rather the essential nature of creation is something we share with Him, like Him...as well as the capacity for free will to make what we want, say what we want, and do what we want (autonomy). So really, the intelligent design is AMAZING because we can only go so far until we come full circle to the reality of things -- everything is up for grabs, in dispute because....
We created it.
We didn't create nature, but the things IN nature, how we use it, how we go about looking at it, instruments used to observe, etc....we created it all. We use/d our capacity for creation using imagination, reason, argument, curiosity and the like to come up with ways of measurement and observation, arguments and ways of finding and using supporting evidence that is enacted synonymously, used together with and in Nature and its principles of existence that God created and established.
There is no difference.
Thursday, May 28, 2009
Monday, May 18, 2009
The Answer Book
As someone who would fit into the category of a "realist," I felt it important to explain my reasoning in why the asnwer book is so important. in a world that is consistently workable yet fallible in so many ways, it seems as if the notion of unanswered questions doesn't necessarily seem like a bad idea. After all, things work. Rockets do fly, sattelites are in the air, buildings are built, cars drive across bridges, medicine treats illness, pain goes away, cures are discovered, and in some cases lives are saved. Every now and then, we experience flukess -- times when rockets disentegrate in the air, bridges fall, buildings fail when they weren't supposed to, pain doesn't go away, and illnesses still remain. For the sake of my readers, I will attempt to state my arguments in a fairly concise fashion....These are the reasons why reading the answer book is important and most workable:
1.) EVERYONE would love having the answer book and coming to terms with answers that were once unknown.
It's a matter of fact that people enjoy finding out the absolute truth on something or someone. There is a feeling of accomplishment, a feeling of "now I can move on," a feeling of gratitude, and an assurance that helps to add confidence and stability. Psychology alone tells us this truth. Having the answer book readily accessible would be of everyone's benefit as things would become more than workable, but stable and assured.
2.) Having the answer book would keep our track record clean, except in cases of "Screw-ups" of method and execution.
When someone has the right answer, it is more than possible to build something, to do something, to enjoy something, and to always answer the question. Could you imagine what life would be like if we knew the EXACT coordinates to every planet's location, how it changed, the exact force of gravity, exact location of the different atmospheres, and the exact understanding of what the universe is composed of. Could you imagine the doors that would open in terms of opportunity? Could you imagine if we understood every aspect of mathematics, why it was created, how it is created, and the exact answers to every problem? Our efforts would be flawless UNLESS laziness set in. We'd know exactly who to blame, we'd know exactly what to do in almost every circumstance. Rockets would launch with perfect smooth sailing.
Another example to consider is medicine. If we understood exactly how the human body works with no doubts, and we understood exactly how checmicals responded to those that are present in the human body, and the relationships between them, perhaps we could come up with perfect medicines. Instead of medicine killing thousands of people each year, it would heal. Instead of medicine treating one thing yet damaging another (Ibprofen, for example, treats inflammation and gets rid of pain, but compromises the very structure of your stomach and if taken over a long period of time can increase chances of stroke and heart attack -- that's closer to death!!!! :-\ !! ), medicine could possibly accomplish everything we want it to do, treat the problem and leave us healthy and ready to go...not dependent, not damaged.
These are only two reasons why I consider the answer book to be very important. At the same time, I have settled with the fact that God hasn't revealed some things to us, which is ok. He is perfect and so I'm comfortable with not knowing everything and knowing the exact answers...however I do look forward to the day when perfection is a matter of everyday existence instead of a "best-guessing" game.
1.) EVERYONE would love having the answer book and coming to terms with answers that were once unknown.
It's a matter of fact that people enjoy finding out the absolute truth on something or someone. There is a feeling of accomplishment, a feeling of "now I can move on," a feeling of gratitude, and an assurance that helps to add confidence and stability. Psychology alone tells us this truth. Having the answer book readily accessible would be of everyone's benefit as things would become more than workable, but stable and assured.
2.) Having the answer book would keep our track record clean, except in cases of "Screw-ups" of method and execution.
When someone has the right answer, it is more than possible to build something, to do something, to enjoy something, and to always answer the question. Could you imagine what life would be like if we knew the EXACT coordinates to every planet's location, how it changed, the exact force of gravity, exact location of the different atmospheres, and the exact understanding of what the universe is composed of. Could you imagine the doors that would open in terms of opportunity? Could you imagine if we understood every aspect of mathematics, why it was created, how it is created, and the exact answers to every problem? Our efforts would be flawless UNLESS laziness set in. We'd know exactly who to blame, we'd know exactly what to do in almost every circumstance. Rockets would launch with perfect smooth sailing.
Another example to consider is medicine. If we understood exactly how the human body works with no doubts, and we understood exactly how checmicals responded to those that are present in the human body, and the relationships between them, perhaps we could come up with perfect medicines. Instead of medicine killing thousands of people each year, it would heal. Instead of medicine treating one thing yet damaging another (Ibprofen, for example, treats inflammation and gets rid of pain, but compromises the very structure of your stomach and if taken over a long period of time can increase chances of stroke and heart attack -- that's closer to death!!!! :-\ !! ), medicine could possibly accomplish everything we want it to do, treat the problem and leave us healthy and ready to go...not dependent, not damaged.
These are only two reasons why I consider the answer book to be very important. At the same time, I have settled with the fact that God hasn't revealed some things to us, which is ok. He is perfect and so I'm comfortable with not knowing everything and knowing the exact answers...however I do look forward to the day when perfection is a matter of everyday existence instead of a "best-guessing" game.
Wednesday, May 13, 2009
Laboratories - Latour Chap. 2
Moving from the representations of scientists work, we now come to the locations. This is a very interesting ordeal, here. Considering the various mobilization efforts and executions of information the world employs, to arrive at the very spot where ideas are thought of, tested, challenged, re-created, and primarily defined is a privilege. I raise my glass (of grape juice) to Latour, "Thank you for giving me a glance into this world. To Latour!"
At this point, I feel a dissenter is basically at a complete loss in this stage of "dissenting" as I will call it. He has gone through multiple different avenues to access crucial and pertinent information, often running into black boxes and/or supporters of these black boxes. As he now comes to the place where ideas originate and are tested, defined and executed, we, the watchers see very many different things. I'd like to expound on my thinking a little bit about these issues:
Inscriptions - A place where the dissenter encounters information that has been gathered via instruments, and/or different things and has been documented in support of the hypotheses/theories being tested. This process is interesting to me because it puts things into perspective with respect to the reality of scientists work and bring the invisible and unrepresented information into perspective that is visible, readable, measurable, and - for lack of better terms - interact-able. I've come to realize that inscription are crucial to the process of mobilization -- without inscriptions, people wouldn't really have anything to read, thus nothing to refer to, thus nothing to support, thus the non-making of black boxes.
Spokesmen and women - I always realized the importance of someone acting as a primary force to drive the progress of some new action or theory, but here Latour really brought things to life. As the ones who don't speak, the hypotheses and new ideas have no choice BUT to have someone speak for them in order to become public and useful for others to use.
Trials of Strength - This is the primary way of executing what Kosso defines as objectivity. New ypotheses and ideas , and discoveries from the like are tested under the scrutiny and pessimism of other actors who are unaware of these findings. Question, after question, after question, after question is thrown about various different elements that act as support to new discoveries. Without this process, new ideas and new discoveries are nothing. Or as my fellow tutor puts it, "you get laughed out of the building." Trials of strength really embody this process of figuring out which to throw out and which to not throw out.
Borrowing from other black boxes - This is the place where we can really see a connection between Latour and Kosso's auxiliary theories. The truth is, no matter how much we try to be the genius who comes with new ideas we neccessarily can't because they are tied into many different theories abotu the world that already exist. We are trained and brought up to believe certain things about the world and it is the use of these things that we come to understand or think about new ideas. Even those that are being tested in counter-laboratories.
Making actors betray their representatives - This is an itneresting new concept that I never thought about, and quite honestly, I think it is intriguing. I don't think that it is a key component to the dissenting process, however.
For the sake of writing I will stop here and touch on the other subjects later. As a partial conclusion, I am beginning to see the incredible process dissenters have to go through in order to dive into the upstream side of things. It is interesting. It is intriguing and it is intense. Basically, i will re-think diving into dissension opinions when I am faced with new issues in the world. There is a huge notion of WORK -- a four letter-word -- that comes along with dissension. I see why Latour says the dissenter either has to walk out or be prepared to do a whoooole lot of work and spend money in the meantime trying to enact these processes . I prefer to walk out!
At this point, I feel a dissenter is basically at a complete loss in this stage of "dissenting" as I will call it. He has gone through multiple different avenues to access crucial and pertinent information, often running into black boxes and/or supporters of these black boxes. As he now comes to the place where ideas originate and are tested, defined and executed, we, the watchers see very many different things. I'd like to expound on my thinking a little bit about these issues:
Inscriptions - A place where the dissenter encounters information that has been gathered via instruments, and/or different things and has been documented in support of the hypotheses/theories being tested. This process is interesting to me because it puts things into perspective with respect to the reality of scientists work and bring the invisible and unrepresented information into perspective that is visible, readable, measurable, and - for lack of better terms - interact-able. I've come to realize that inscription are crucial to the process of mobilization -- without inscriptions, people wouldn't really have anything to read, thus nothing to refer to, thus nothing to support, thus the non-making of black boxes.
Spokesmen and women - I always realized the importance of someone acting as a primary force to drive the progress of some new action or theory, but here Latour really brought things to life. As the ones who don't speak, the hypotheses and new ideas have no choice BUT to have someone speak for them in order to become public and useful for others to use.
Trials of Strength - This is the primary way of executing what Kosso defines as objectivity. New ypotheses and ideas , and discoveries from the like are tested under the scrutiny and pessimism of other actors who are unaware of these findings. Question, after question, after question, after question is thrown about various different elements that act as support to new discoveries. Without this process, new ideas and new discoveries are nothing. Or as my fellow tutor puts it, "you get laughed out of the building." Trials of strength really embody this process of figuring out which to throw out and which to not throw out.
Borrowing from other black boxes - This is the place where we can really see a connection between Latour and Kosso's auxiliary theories. The truth is, no matter how much we try to be the genius who comes with new ideas we neccessarily can't because they are tied into many different theories abotu the world that already exist. We are trained and brought up to believe certain things about the world and it is the use of these things that we come to understand or think about new ideas. Even those that are being tested in counter-laboratories.
Making actors betray their representatives - This is an itneresting new concept that I never thought about, and quite honestly, I think it is intriguing. I don't think that it is a key component to the dissenting process, however.
For the sake of writing I will stop here and touch on the other subjects later. As a partial conclusion, I am beginning to see the incredible process dissenters have to go through in order to dive into the upstream side of things. It is interesting. It is intriguing and it is intense. Basically, i will re-think diving into dissension opinions when I am faced with new issues in the world. There is a huge notion of WORK -- a four letter-word -- that comes along with dissension. I see why Latour says the dissenter either has to walk out or be prepared to do a whoooole lot of work and spend money in the meantime trying to enact these processes . I prefer to walk out!
Friday, May 8, 2009
Kosso Chapter 7 Reflections
Kosso strikes again. I really enjoy this book.
pg. 124, "Observations...are themselves, assertive beliefs...they are described and justified under the influence of other beliefs...other assertive claims within our awareness...always comparing theory against theory...are not avoidable complications..."
pg. 125, "In science, no one ever gets a look at the answer key."
Can we really find security in the notion of justification as coherence, if the "cohered" is a bunch of theories unable to be verified in an answer key? Kosso, in Chapter 7, makes the argument that coherence is indicative of truth. Sure, this may be so....I would love to believe that -- but I am so unsettled with the knowledge that people walk around with this supposed trophy of science that is incscripted with the words "science discovers truth" and/or "science is truth". Why, because other scientists understand a very different philosophical viewpoint...they say that the underlying philosophy of science is the fact that "we really can't discover truth. Instead, we can discover things that cohere with our current theories that we believe to be true, but aren't really sure because we don't have access to the answer key." These are very fundamentally different positions being held within the same field. There is a very popular statement within the culture of God, "Every kingdom divided against itself will be ruined, and every city or household divided against itself will not stand." With very different fundamental beliefs...who knows what's really going on behind the scenes? It kind of scares me that the very foundation of science is divided in such a way. Sure The Church is divided on issues, but in the notion of its existence, the very fibers of its being, are a few foundational principles that we agree on that keep us standing: Our very existence is based off of the acknowledgement of the truth of the existence of God our Creator and His love for us by acting in that love and sending His Son, Jesus, to bridge the gap between Himself and His Creations (humans). That's the one thing that we ALL agree on no matter how differently we stand on different issues. This is the one fact that we all know and agree to, which is the very first and most crucial -- metaphorically speaking -- atomic building block of the elements that make us who we are. It has kept and keeps His kingdom standing in the earth for thousands of years, continuing to grow and that extends into eternity and beyond -- despite other influences, anger, contention, and social change. It goes beyond even the universe!
But to prevent myself from digging deeper into that subject matter, allow me to conclude with Kosso's -- what I like to call -- new definition of objectivity. I mean, just in googling the definition of objectivity, I saw a load of very different interpretations mostly referring to the ones studying the predicament. http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&defl=en&q=define:objectivity&ei=l4kHSuaxKKDqtQPc55HsAQ&sa=X&oi=glossary_definition&ct=title
To hear Kosso explain and define objectivity the way he does, is hilarious. I feel that it helps to pinpoint the exact meaning of objectivity -- insofar as human reason and understanding allow -- a meaning that, even through careful and attentive cross-examination and attack comes, will withstand. "An attitude of openness to challenge...." and as Kuhn adds, "...from different paradigms that include different language, scientific procedure, and "good-bad" criteria for evaluation." This claim is so bold and amazes me that it shines such true light of the truth, really.
Just as a post-script I will say, I'm happy to see that Kosso admits to how science can be wrong in chapter 7. It's comforting...as a human endeavor influenced by MANY things -- as Latour explains -- humanly speaking, it is VERY VERY VERY hard to make completely accurate assertions of the world; to take it a step further, without God. What's funny is, we talked about this notion in our Business Ethics class. Science was born out of the desire for people to get away from having to "consult" the Creator. It's hilarious that it now runs into these predicaments and makes the philosophical discoveries they have made -- "we can't get to the truth". When all the while, He was just seeking a heart-felt effort to know Him and His creation. He gladly gives answers. I'm an example of that.
pg. 124, "Observations...are themselves, assertive beliefs...they are described and justified under the influence of other beliefs...other assertive claims within our awareness...always comparing theory against theory...are not avoidable complications..."
pg. 125, "In science, no one ever gets a look at the answer key."
pg.127, "Effects are all we have to work with."
Perhaps I'm being a bit of a hard-head but I cannot help but to ask this question: if all we have to ask about the unobservables/lack of ability to discover the "correspondence-to-the-facts truth" is based on what we currently know (our inferences and assertive beliefs also known as theoretical claims), or what Kosso describes as being stuck at the effects end of the chain even though we are interested in the causal end, how can we then make the predictions -- especially in cases of low-levels of observability, i.e. cosmic activity, atomic activity, or the like -- that "effect x is indicative of cause y?" Is it really fair to say that we would have the ability to predict effect x, based off of cause y...if we do not understand cause y, but rather only are aware of its certain features?Can we really find security in the notion of justification as coherence, if the "cohered" is a bunch of theories unable to be verified in an answer key? Kosso, in Chapter 7, makes the argument that coherence is indicative of truth. Sure, this may be so....I would love to believe that -- but I am so unsettled with the knowledge that people walk around with this supposed trophy of science that is incscripted with the words "science discovers truth" and/or "science is truth". Why, because other scientists understand a very different philosophical viewpoint...they say that the underlying philosophy of science is the fact that "we really can't discover truth. Instead, we can discover things that cohere with our current theories that we believe to be true, but aren't really sure because we don't have access to the answer key." These are very fundamentally different positions being held within the same field. There is a very popular statement within the culture of God, "Every kingdom divided against itself will be ruined, and every city or household divided against itself will not stand." With very different fundamental beliefs...who knows what's really going on behind the scenes? It kind of scares me that the very foundation of science is divided in such a way. Sure The Church is divided on issues, but in the notion of its existence, the very fibers of its being, are a few foundational principles that we agree on that keep us standing: Our very existence is based off of the acknowledgement of the truth of the existence of God our Creator and His love for us by acting in that love and sending His Son, Jesus, to bridge the gap between Himself and His Creations (humans). That's the one thing that we ALL agree on no matter how differently we stand on different issues. This is the one fact that we all know and agree to, which is the very first and most crucial -- metaphorically speaking -- atomic building block of the elements that make us who we are. It has kept and keeps His kingdom standing in the earth for thousands of years, continuing to grow and that extends into eternity and beyond -- despite other influences, anger, contention, and social change. It goes beyond even the universe!
But to prevent myself from digging deeper into that subject matter, allow me to conclude with Kosso's -- what I like to call -- new definition of objectivity. I mean, just in googling the definition of objectivity, I saw a load of very different interpretations mostly referring to the ones studying the predicament. http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&defl=en&q=define:objectivity&ei=l4kHSuaxKKDqtQPc55HsAQ&sa=X&oi=glossary_definition&ct=title
To hear Kosso explain and define objectivity the way he does, is hilarious. I feel that it helps to pinpoint the exact meaning of objectivity -- insofar as human reason and understanding allow -- a meaning that, even through careful and attentive cross-examination and attack comes, will withstand. "An attitude of openness to challenge...." and as Kuhn adds, "...from different paradigms that include different language, scientific procedure, and "good-bad" criteria for evaluation." This claim is so bold and amazes me that it shines such true light of the truth, really.
Just as a post-script I will say, I'm happy to see that Kosso admits to how science can be wrong in chapter 7. It's comforting...as a human endeavor influenced by MANY things -- as Latour explains -- humanly speaking, it is VERY VERY VERY hard to make completely accurate assertions of the world; to take it a step further, without God. What's funny is, we talked about this notion in our Business Ethics class. Science was born out of the desire for people to get away from having to "consult" the Creator. It's hilarious that it now runs into these predicaments and makes the philosophical discoveries they have made -- "we can't get to the truth". When all the while, He was just seeking a heart-felt effort to know Him and His creation. He gladly gives answers. I'm an example of that.
Monday, April 27, 2009
Confirmation, Underdetermination, and Observation - The Scientific Method
Tonight was an interesting night.
I tutor at Self Enhancement, Inc. on Monday nights and tonight turned out to be a very special occasion. I have to be honest and admit that the tutors and I really weren't doing what we should've been doing -- tutoring -- because we were engaged in what my mom and I say mockingly, "an intellectual exchange." The subject of our conversation was Kosso and Latour's claims. We were playing with the ideas of conspiracy theory and how it relates to the supposed venir pandemic of swine flu, and many other topics when we came to the discussion of medicine and science. It is then that I blurted out with oodles of enthusiasm, "I'm taking this class at PSU called Science Power Knowledge and it's amazing! It basically flips the idea that science is objective right upside down on its head." Immediately, feathers started ruffling; I think it safe to say that I think I saw a few plucked from the skin. My primary "competitor" in the conversation threw out words like, "pseudoscience", "sociology", and "wackos" when I was explaining the concepts of Kosso's book.
I say all this as a prelude to my discussions of chapters 7, 8 and 9 -- Confirmation, Undetermination, and Observation.
The ideas of confirmation, defined by Kosso as being incremental (or varying by degree) are interesting to think about. This was part of the discussion between my colleague and I. We were discussing the activities of rocket science. His argument was, "Science works. Rockets go into space, satellites orbit the earth and that is due to science." My contention with that statement was simply, "some satellites blow up. Some don't make it out. Some rockets disintegrate in the air, some rockets don't launch successfully. These circumstances occur even in the event of the math and formulas done correctly...what do we say then?" This comment, I feel, was a direct example of Kosso's claim of incremental confirmation -- or inching closer to the truth. Why? Because when it really comes down the "nitty-gritty" or the "truth" of the matter -- if you will -- there is always a chance that we could be wrong or have one part of the equation mixed up and hence -- rockets fall out of the sky, satellites leave the gravitational pull of the earth and are sucked into space, and rockets disintegrate in the air.
When Kosso further explains how, in the above mentioned cases, we usually turn to the methods of executing the experiments, I had nothing to say. Because this is also absolutely true. Sometimes the methods by which we go about experimenting or testing a hypothesis are done incorrectly and thus give the result of appearing to "falsify" a claim. However, I think it pertinent not to forget this question, what if the experiments themselves in their presence, or in their execution, in their instrumental and cognitive involvement contribute to the confirmation of a theory? Could we really say that a theory is correct? Usually the experiments are performed under strict controlled circumstances -- we can't forget that the very existence of the controlled environment plays a role in the outcome of testing hypotheses.
The concept of auxiliary theories are also and interesting part of the discussion of confirmation. Now, here I would like to spend a little more time because I love the notion of auxiliary theories -- this term really frames my own pondering on this issue (but were unnamed). When you think of a musical ensemble, or a jazz/r&b group that's playing together there are these instruments that are called auxiliary instruments. These instruments, although they are not apart of "foundational elements" of the band that's playing, they play an important role in a musical piece. As a musician -- to hear that an auxiliary keyboardist will be playing at your gig is more than a smile on the face. Auxiliary keys (theories) add so much juice, strength, so much power, and authority, beauty, emphasis, and invitation to a song. Just as Latour explains in Chapter 2 of his book, Laboratories, a good claim withstands a trial of strength (listeners, in the case of music) when the other claims/black boxes supporting it (ATs) push back. I use this as a reference point to understand auxiliary theories. Without the auxiliary theories about instruments' use and structure, gravity, relativity, and things of the like to support a claim -- there really wouldn't bee too many claims held together. These "ATs"/"AIs" make for an inviting, engaging, and all around good song...
For the sake of reading time I will now harbor on the notions of instrumentalists, realists, and empiricists. The stark contrast between these three scientific "parties" is intriguing and I would really enjoy exploring it further. I like the idea of instrumentalists in that, they are ready to work and want to continue moving. In some aspect, it think this attitude is very healthy in some scientific respects. However, when it comes to crucial things like medicine, global warming, and stuff like that -- instrumentalism can be dangerous, harmful, and potentially life-threatening. Why? Because instrumentalists are wiling to move on without fully coming to the truth. One can only imagine the far-reaching and numerous negative implications this type of scientific bearing would be.
With respect to empiricists, I can pretty much appreciate who they are and what they do and what they consider important. It makes me comfortable to know that some people are pushing to find out the real truth instead of just trying to move on on shaky grounds.
The realist, myself included is an interesting idea to discuss as well. When it really comes down to everything, God made things a certain way and gave us abilities, voices, songs, instrumentalism, and the like to engage in discovering what it is He created. Therefore aiming to discover the truth and THEN deciding to move forward is a GREAT IDEA. Why? Because when we can actually locate the real one-choice truth, we can move on with certainty and things like medicine, or solutions to global warming hold greater force in execution, to actually SOLVE the problem. People say the first way to understand you have a problem is to understand that you do, acknowledge it, and get educated about it....OBSERVE IT, if neccessary, see what others experience.
This brings me to my next discussion of Kosso's Observation claims. Observation is generally the meat and tender of science. In order to bring about confirmation of a claim, observe it. See what it does, hear it, taste it. However, as Kosso explains there are only some things that are "observable." I love the fact that Kosso made this point. It is one of the sole arguments I use when addressing scientists in their "Science can know and does know everything" attitudes. An example we could look at is our understanding of the universe. The universe is a GIANT thing (if it is a thing) that may extend to infinity...Scientists say it does, but we could never really know. One of the key aspects of Science, observing, is not possible in this arena of thought. Why? Because we'd die before we could get out there...unless we come up with a way to find the edge and go to the edge. Another claim to doubt is the fact that the planets orbit the sun, or the sun is the center of the universe....how do we know this? We can't! We've never been there.
An example my fellow tutor used the was the story about the guys who supposedly "replicated" cold fushion -- although we don't even know if cold fushion exists because the sun would kill us before we could go onto it and find out. He said that the guys who did it, their experiments were not replicable and thus they got laughed out of the building because the others could not observe and see what it was. I dare to be "pig-headed" as Latour claims and say, "Well, what if they did and it's just not replicable? Could be unlikely or not...we don't know because we weren't there. What if every time the other scientists tried, the conditions weren't right?" It is simply unobservable. So while the ability to onserve is a very key aspect to scientific work, it simply is not the bottom line for discovering truth and thus seeing something does not make it neccessarily true, nor does the absence of the ability to see something make that something false. Instead, it makes it unobservable -- there are limits.
I tutor at Self Enhancement, Inc. on Monday nights and tonight turned out to be a very special occasion. I have to be honest and admit that the tutors and I really weren't doing what we should've been doing -- tutoring -- because we were engaged in what my mom and I say mockingly, "an intellectual exchange." The subject of our conversation was Kosso and Latour's claims. We were playing with the ideas of conspiracy theory and how it relates to the supposed venir pandemic of swine flu, and many other topics when we came to the discussion of medicine and science. It is then that I blurted out with oodles of enthusiasm, "I'm taking this class at PSU called Science Power Knowledge and it's amazing! It basically flips the idea that science is objective right upside down on its head." Immediately, feathers started ruffling; I think it safe to say that I think I saw a few plucked from the skin. My primary "competitor" in the conversation threw out words like, "pseudoscience", "sociology", and "wackos" when I was explaining the concepts of Kosso's book.
I say all this as a prelude to my discussions of chapters 7, 8 and 9 -- Confirmation, Undetermination, and Observation.
The ideas of confirmation, defined by Kosso as being incremental (or varying by degree) are interesting to think about. This was part of the discussion between my colleague and I. We were discussing the activities of rocket science. His argument was, "Science works. Rockets go into space, satellites orbit the earth and that is due to science." My contention with that statement was simply, "some satellites blow up. Some don't make it out. Some rockets disintegrate in the air, some rockets don't launch successfully. These circumstances occur even in the event of the math and formulas done correctly...what do we say then?" This comment, I feel, was a direct example of Kosso's claim of incremental confirmation -- or inching closer to the truth. Why? Because when it really comes down the "nitty-gritty" or the "truth" of the matter -- if you will -- there is always a chance that we could be wrong or have one part of the equation mixed up and hence -- rockets fall out of the sky, satellites leave the gravitational pull of the earth and are sucked into space, and rockets disintegrate in the air.
When Kosso further explains how, in the above mentioned cases, we usually turn to the methods of executing the experiments, I had nothing to say. Because this is also absolutely true. Sometimes the methods by which we go about experimenting or testing a hypothesis are done incorrectly and thus give the result of appearing to "falsify" a claim. However, I think it pertinent not to forget this question, what if the experiments themselves in their presence, or in their execution, in their instrumental and cognitive involvement contribute to the confirmation of a theory? Could we really say that a theory is correct? Usually the experiments are performed under strict controlled circumstances -- we can't forget that the very existence of the controlled environment plays a role in the outcome of testing hypotheses.
The concept of auxiliary theories are also and interesting part of the discussion of confirmation. Now, here I would like to spend a little more time because I love the notion of auxiliary theories -- this term really frames my own pondering on this issue (but were unnamed). When you think of a musical ensemble, or a jazz/r&b group that's playing together there are these instruments that are called auxiliary instruments. These instruments, although they are not apart of "foundational elements" of the band that's playing, they play an important role in a musical piece. As a musician -- to hear that an auxiliary keyboardist will be playing at your gig is more than a smile on the face. Auxiliary keys (theories) add so much juice, strength, so much power, and authority, beauty, emphasis, and invitation to a song. Just as Latour explains in Chapter 2 of his book, Laboratories, a good claim withstands a trial of strength (listeners, in the case of music) when the other claims/black boxes supporting it (ATs) push back. I use this as a reference point to understand auxiliary theories. Without the auxiliary theories about instruments' use and structure, gravity, relativity, and things of the like to support a claim -- there really wouldn't bee too many claims held together. These "ATs"/"AIs" make for an inviting, engaging, and all around good song...
For the sake of reading time I will now harbor on the notions of instrumentalists, realists, and empiricists. The stark contrast between these three scientific "parties" is intriguing and I would really enjoy exploring it further. I like the idea of instrumentalists in that, they are ready to work and want to continue moving. In some aspect, it think this attitude is very healthy in some scientific respects. However, when it comes to crucial things like medicine, global warming, and stuff like that -- instrumentalism can be dangerous, harmful, and potentially life-threatening. Why? Because instrumentalists are wiling to move on without fully coming to the truth. One can only imagine the far-reaching and numerous negative implications this type of scientific bearing would be.
With respect to empiricists, I can pretty much appreciate who they are and what they do and what they consider important. It makes me comfortable to know that some people are pushing to find out the real truth instead of just trying to move on on shaky grounds.
The realist, myself included is an interesting idea to discuss as well. When it really comes down to everything, God made things a certain way and gave us abilities, voices, songs, instrumentalism, and the like to engage in discovering what it is He created. Therefore aiming to discover the truth and THEN deciding to move forward is a GREAT IDEA. Why? Because when we can actually locate the real one-choice truth, we can move on with certainty and things like medicine, or solutions to global warming hold greater force in execution, to actually SOLVE the problem. People say the first way to understand you have a problem is to understand that you do, acknowledge it, and get educated about it....OBSERVE IT, if neccessary, see what others experience.
This brings me to my next discussion of Kosso's Observation claims. Observation is generally the meat and tender of science. In order to bring about confirmation of a claim, observe it. See what it does, hear it, taste it. However, as Kosso explains there are only some things that are "observable." I love the fact that Kosso made this point. It is one of the sole arguments I use when addressing scientists in their "Science can know and does know everything" attitudes. An example we could look at is our understanding of the universe. The universe is a GIANT thing (if it is a thing) that may extend to infinity...Scientists say it does, but we could never really know. One of the key aspects of Science, observing, is not possible in this arena of thought. Why? Because we'd die before we could get out there...unless we come up with a way to find the edge and go to the edge. Another claim to doubt is the fact that the planets orbit the sun, or the sun is the center of the universe....how do we know this? We can't! We've never been there.
An example my fellow tutor used the was the story about the guys who supposedly "replicated" cold fushion -- although we don't even know if cold fushion exists because the sun would kill us before we could go onto it and find out. He said that the guys who did it, their experiments were not replicable and thus they got laughed out of the building because the others could not observe and see what it was. I dare to be "pig-headed" as Latour claims and say, "Well, what if they did and it's just not replicable? Could be unlikely or not...we don't know because we weren't there. What if every time the other scientists tried, the conditions weren't right?" It is simply unobservable. So while the ability to onserve is a very key aspect to scientific work, it simply is not the bottom line for discovering truth and thus seeing something does not make it neccessarily true, nor does the absence of the ability to see something make that something false. Instead, it makes it unobservable -- there are limits.
Sunday, April 19, 2009
Peter Kosso - Intro thru Chapter 3
Peter Kosso - Intro thru Chapter 3
It is extremely difficult to summarize and comment on Kosso's reading without making this blog entry long. I apologize for the long entry, but there is so much I want to say that I possibly could not say less. I must say, as a fair introduction to my discussion, that I really appreciate reading this book. For a long time I have pondered on the philosophy of science. However being that I am not a person who is particularly engaged in and with the scientific community on a regular basis -- I was very doubtful of my conclusions. I was only able to make "outsider" inferences of my notions about the composition and elements of the scientific philosophy. Hence, one can only imagine how ecstatic I was about reading this book. It's been a joy and as time and lack of stress allows, I'm pretty sure I will continue to enjoy it.
So I will begin with the introduction of Peter Kosso's book, Reading The Book Of Nature: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science.
I could write pages and pages on some of the sentences I have encountered in reading the introduction, but I will use only a few quotes from throughout the introduction. The idea I would like to expose my thinking on is the suggestion that we have two reasons to be skeptical of success as justification of science's authority. The first being that, "The criteria and measure of success [ within the domain of nonspecialist not being able to check scientific findings/claims themselves ] are the business of experts [the scientists]...in this sense science is a largely self-regulating business whose success in crucial areas is self-proclaimed." And the second being that "scientific description of the world changes over time." The only thing I have to say about what Kosso says here is "Amen." Because, as I stated earlier in my blog "Fact is Fact. Fiction is Fiction," at one point scientists believed that physical attributes of a person were indicative of academic/working capacity and status. This has changed over time as we now notice that the access to opportunity and individual merit are often indicative of academic/working capacity and status. I misquoted myself when saying "intelligence" because I don't even think that word exists -- it's way too relative. With respect to the first point made about why to be skeptical of success as justification -- this reminds me of the journey of the dissenter we are experiencing in Latour's book. Once we continue upstream into the business of "Fact-making" those who are not specialists/interested in all the work that comes along with fact making (Those who are not trained to do so, and are not in the business of doing so) drop out and/or are unable to understand what is really going on. So it is entirely true that looking at success as justification for science is unfair (in scientific standards) because the business IS self-regulating and the success "Self-proclaimed" -- i.e. proclaimed by those who do the very same things as the ones who came up with the idea(s).
Now when it comes to Kosso's discussion about Theories, I have to say that I was absolutely glued to the book. If I understood Kosso correctly, he was attempting to alter a current perception of theories as being notions/ideas about the world that can not be true because theory is associated with the words "made-up" and can never be proven absolutely true. He goes on to say that Theories, instead, are statements that scientists are going into the business of discussing, testing, and supporting/disproving thus making them measurable within a spectrum of "well-supported" and "not-very-well-supported." While I agree that PERHAPS Kosso is clarifying a seemingly misunderstood term, he didn't really change the current perception for me. As a matter of fact, he solidified it. Because as he comes to the conclusion of chapter 1 (or maybe it was chapter 2) the conclusions that scientists discover/seek to justify are never really made into being completely solidified but are rewarded on their level of falsifiability. This supports the statement "well that's just a theory." Because theory is never completely settled as "Truth", it is instead settled as, "What we have come to understand based on our experiments, hypotheses (tested or waiting to be tested), relations/correspondence and coherence with other theories and/or laws. With all that said, the claim we are trying to make still has the potential/room to be falsified and proven wrong." This kind of makes reference to what I said about the implications of elective modernism -- living in a world where the standard is not truth but expertise and fallibility is the name of our foundational teachings and ways of life. It would be VERY difficult for the non-expert person to believe anything that is being said or claimed because they'd be encouraged/reminded of the idea of fallibility. I can only imagine a world with no certainty. I hope we continue to only imagine a world like that. Yikes!
Internal and External virtues are also very intriguing to me as we continue to move through the introduction to the third chapter of Kosso's book. Before I begin the explanation of my thinking with respect to these topics I must say this in response to this quote:
" There are only features that indicate truth. You never get to go home and see unambiguously that atomic theory, for example, is true. But you can do the best you can."
My uncomfortability with this statement is this: Why can't science just make a claim, test it, and then if tested correctly and "proven" to be true, say "this is truth"? If they are "proven" wrong at some point the only thing they have to say at that point is "Whoops. I was wrong. The truth wasn't my previous conclusion." I do not believe that it is inherently wrong for someone to say, "This is truth and there's no way of proving it false." If they are proven false it just means that they were wrong and now they have to fix how they think and admit to their statement being wrong. It happens.
With respect to things that can not be "proven" or aren't "testable" it's just a matter of trust. I think it stupid to disregard something that isn't "testable" i.e. not available. What's wrong with trusting what somebody says? In a sense, that's the foundation of science anyway. At one point, someone made a claim that had no references or theories to compare with. Someone just had to make up in their mind about something and go with it. That's trust. In my culture we call that Faith. The substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen.
Moving on to Internal and External values. This was an eye-opener for me, and a completely new concept to digest. The internal virtue of entrenchment was an interesting virtue that reminded me a lot of Latour's discussion about moving upstream into the world of black boxes. ust as as Latour constantly explains about the web-worky connections from theories that are connected to other theories that are connected to other theories. I almost came to the solid conclusion that Kosso was against any new information based on what he says on page 37, "...A theory should be plausible, given what we already know (or better phrased: what we think we may know; our "room-for-fallibility" theories)," until he finally explained how adhering strictly to the virtue of entrenchment is a bad thing.
Explanatory cooperation (aka a subset of entrenchment) reminded me of Latour's expansion on positive and negative modalities with an emphasis on the positive, "...the explanatory link gives [coinciding/supportive theories] mutual support. (pg. 38)" The newly proclaimed theory, in the process of justification, is supposed to support the theories it is entrenched in, or making reference/fact-making support to. Supposedly this is "truth-conducive." That term is a WHOLE different area of debate that would require many more words that I will not say.
Testability: I made mention of my thoughts about that a little earlier in this entry, ...The concept of falsifiability or refutability. Thea idea that responsible justification is comprised of the requirement of falsifiability is, as I said earlier in this entry and in the Implications of Elective Modernism, troubling. There are too many things in this world that are not testable that are crucial to our existence. To say that these are not "Truth-conducive" is plain wrong. Put simply, I disagree with the notion that responsible theory justification requires that something has to be able to be testable to the possibility of being proven false. This notion seems quite irrational, proud, and immature. Basically it's a way of saying, "don't trust anything unless you can see it for yourself and find the same finding." It's not humble, it's timid.
With respect to the virtue of "Generality", I say what I said just above this paragraph. Supposedly generality enhances testability because there is more room for being tested and maybe proven false. This statement is true, but it doesn't make it valuable in my opinion. Generality being a feature is acceptable, but describing it as a valuable feature may go too far in its evaluation. Just because a description may make reference or explain many things all at once at all (or many) times doesn't make it more valuable. It just makes the theory more general.
Simplicity: i really like the fact that Kosso explains how the idea of simplicity and the determination of what is simple and what is not is dependent upon cultural/linguistic/social understandings. I believe that is entirely true and irrefutable. However, my question with response to the idea of simplicity being a "Valuable feature" is: would simplicity really be valuable if we just taught people that complication and thinking complexly is not a bad thing? Really the idea that theories are more valuable when they are simple because they are easier to work with is just a reflection of the current value and expectation we have with time. If it's easier to work with, it takes less time, if it takes less time, we can accomplish" more" within a given amount of time. This then suggests that it is better to do more in less time than it is to do less with more time. Perhaps we only need to shift this understanding and let complexity have it's rightful place in our world and stop avoiding it. We need to realign our thinking with respect to time and just learn to take more time to do more things. Fast pace isn't the best. Simplicity is not objective.
"External values...indicate...that [a] theory...is accountable to observations." Again, this is another suggestion that testability is what makes a theory valuable with implications of constant uncertainty -- something I am very uncomfortable with. The external virtue of explanation is that "a good theory should be able to explain some observed phenomena." (pg. 47) It was somewhat difficult to explain how this virtue is distinguished from the internal virtue of explanatory cooperation. The second external value of testing and confirmation was also difficult for me to distinguish between the internal virtue of testability being that it indubitably elaborates on the notion of "counting" toward falsifiability (pg. 49).
And finally, we come to chapter three which is an attempt at elaborating on the external virtue of explanation. I would like to focus on the amendments made to the covering-law model being that Kosso suggested that his entire explanation of the covering-law was incomplete and thus needed to be amended. Particularly what caught my attention the most was when Kosso says, "[The accomplishment of understanding is] finding the most basic patterns in the events and structure of the world." This is totally indicative of an appreciation for the concept of efficiency and then using it as a standard for judgment of what warrants a good theory and a bad theory in explanation. As stated earlier, how can we finalize this account? As Kosso stated earlier, the explanation of a theory in "basic" form is almost entirely based on the cultural appreciation/description and use of language and measurement. Nonetheless I appreciate that he goes on to explain that the external feature of explanation of causal theories (answers to the why questions) are influenced by the internal concerns of a theory. It helped to clarify the distinction between the internal virtue of internal explanation and external explanation.
To conclude, I want to point out that Kosso finally supports my claim that living in a "Fallible" world would be disastrous. Just as my head continues to spin in trying to understand and come to grips with the circular logic of science philosophy, so I'm sure the world outside of academia would as well. As a connection to my claim about a world of fallibility living in elective modernism, on page 65 Kosso writes, "Successful explanation certainly does not guarantee that the explaining theory is true." Just because a theory explains a phenomena does not mean the explanation is really what causes the phenomena. But the sad part about all of this, as I stated earlier is (pg. 68) "It is hard to tell when we've got a genuinely causal explanation...explanation construed as identification of the cause is indicative of truth, but is too difficult to evaluate." It's circular logic because part of the whole POINT of the philosophy of science and determining "responsible" and "good" justification is a claims ability to be tested, i.e. evaluated. This is disastrous if we decide to live in a world with this kind of logic. It would make people's heads go in circles until finally exploding!
It is extremely difficult to summarize and comment on Kosso's reading without making this blog entry long. I apologize for the long entry, but there is so much I want to say that I possibly could not say less. I must say, as a fair introduction to my discussion, that I really appreciate reading this book. For a long time I have pondered on the philosophy of science. However being that I am not a person who is particularly engaged in and with the scientific community on a regular basis -- I was very doubtful of my conclusions. I was only able to make "outsider" inferences of my notions about the composition and elements of the scientific philosophy. Hence, one can only imagine how ecstatic I was about reading this book. It's been a joy and as time and lack of stress allows, I'm pretty sure I will continue to enjoy it.
So I will begin with the introduction of Peter Kosso's book, Reading The Book Of Nature: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science.
I could write pages and pages on some of the sentences I have encountered in reading the introduction, but I will use only a few quotes from throughout the introduction. The idea I would like to expose my thinking on is the suggestion that we have two reasons to be skeptical of success as justification of science's authority. The first being that, "The criteria and measure of success [ within the domain of nonspecialist not being able to check scientific findings/claims themselves ] are the business of experts [the scientists]...in this sense science is a largely self-regulating business whose success in crucial areas is self-proclaimed." And the second being that "scientific description of the world changes over time." The only thing I have to say about what Kosso says here is "Amen." Because, as I stated earlier in my blog "Fact is Fact. Fiction is Fiction," at one point scientists believed that physical attributes of a person were indicative of academic/working capacity and status. This has changed over time as we now notice that the access to opportunity and individual merit are often indicative of academic/working capacity and status. I misquoted myself when saying "intelligence" because I don't even think that word exists -- it's way too relative. With respect to the first point made about why to be skeptical of success as justification -- this reminds me of the journey of the dissenter we are experiencing in Latour's book. Once we continue upstream into the business of "Fact-making" those who are not specialists/interested in all the work that comes along with fact making (Those who are not trained to do so, and are not in the business of doing so) drop out and/or are unable to understand what is really going on. So it is entirely true that looking at success as justification for science is unfair (in scientific standards) because the business IS self-regulating and the success "Self-proclaimed" -- i.e. proclaimed by those who do the very same things as the ones who came up with the idea(s).
Now when it comes to Kosso's discussion about Theories, I have to say that I was absolutely glued to the book. If I understood Kosso correctly, he was attempting to alter a current perception of theories as being notions/ideas about the world that can not be true because theory is associated with the words "made-up" and can never be proven absolutely true. He goes on to say that Theories, instead, are statements that scientists are going into the business of discussing, testing, and supporting/disproving thus making them measurable within a spectrum of "well-supported" and "not-very-well-supported." While I agree that PERHAPS Kosso is clarifying a seemingly misunderstood term, he didn't really change the current perception for me. As a matter of fact, he solidified it. Because as he comes to the conclusion of chapter 1 (or maybe it was chapter 2) the conclusions that scientists discover/seek to justify are never really made into being completely solidified but are rewarded on their level of falsifiability. This supports the statement "well that's just a theory." Because theory is never completely settled as "Truth", it is instead settled as, "What we have come to understand based on our experiments, hypotheses (tested or waiting to be tested), relations/correspondence and coherence with other theories and/or laws. With all that said, the claim we are trying to make still has the potential/room to be falsified and proven wrong." This kind of makes reference to what I said about the implications of elective modernism -- living in a world where the standard is not truth but expertise and fallibility is the name of our foundational teachings and ways of life. It would be VERY difficult for the non-expert person to believe anything that is being said or claimed because they'd be encouraged/reminded of the idea of fallibility. I can only imagine a world with no certainty. I hope we continue to only imagine a world like that. Yikes!
Internal and External virtues are also very intriguing to me as we continue to move through the introduction to the third chapter of Kosso's book. Before I begin the explanation of my thinking with respect to these topics I must say this in response to this quote:
" There are only features that indicate truth. You never get to go home and see unambiguously that atomic theory, for example, is true. But you can do the best you can."
My uncomfortability with this statement is this: Why can't science just make a claim, test it, and then if tested correctly and "proven" to be true, say "this is truth"? If they are "proven" wrong at some point the only thing they have to say at that point is "Whoops. I was wrong. The truth wasn't my previous conclusion." I do not believe that it is inherently wrong for someone to say, "This is truth and there's no way of proving it false." If they are proven false it just means that they were wrong and now they have to fix how they think and admit to their statement being wrong. It happens.
With respect to things that can not be "proven" or aren't "testable" it's just a matter of trust. I think it stupid to disregard something that isn't "testable" i.e. not available. What's wrong with trusting what somebody says? In a sense, that's the foundation of science anyway. At one point, someone made a claim that had no references or theories to compare with. Someone just had to make up in their mind about something and go with it. That's trust. In my culture we call that Faith. The substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen.
Moving on to Internal and External values. This was an eye-opener for me, and a completely new concept to digest. The internal virtue of entrenchment was an interesting virtue that reminded me a lot of Latour's discussion about moving upstream into the world of black boxes. ust as as Latour constantly explains about the web-worky connections from theories that are connected to other theories that are connected to other theories. I almost came to the solid conclusion that Kosso was against any new information based on what he says on page 37, "...A theory should be plausible, given what we already know (or better phrased: what we think we may know; our "room-for-fallibility" theories)," until he finally explained how adhering strictly to the virtue of entrenchment is a bad thing.
Explanatory cooperation (aka a subset of entrenchment) reminded me of Latour's expansion on positive and negative modalities with an emphasis on the positive, "...the explanatory link gives [coinciding/supportive theories] mutual support. (pg. 38)" The newly proclaimed theory, in the process of justification, is supposed to support the theories it is entrenched in, or making reference/fact-making support to. Supposedly this is "truth-conducive." That term is a WHOLE different area of debate that would require many more words that I will not say.
Testability: I made mention of my thoughts about that a little earlier in this entry, ...The concept of falsifiability or refutability. Thea idea that responsible justification is comprised of the requirement of falsifiability is, as I said earlier in this entry and in the Implications of Elective Modernism, troubling. There are too many things in this world that are not testable that are crucial to our existence. To say that these are not "Truth-conducive" is plain wrong. Put simply, I disagree with the notion that responsible theory justification requires that something has to be able to be testable to the possibility of being proven false. This notion seems quite irrational, proud, and immature. Basically it's a way of saying, "don't trust anything unless you can see it for yourself and find the same finding." It's not humble, it's timid.
With respect to the virtue of "Generality", I say what I said just above this paragraph. Supposedly generality enhances testability because there is more room for being tested and maybe proven false. This statement is true, but it doesn't make it valuable in my opinion. Generality being a feature is acceptable, but describing it as a valuable feature may go too far in its evaluation. Just because a description may make reference or explain many things all at once at all (or many) times doesn't make it more valuable. It just makes the theory more general.
Simplicity: i really like the fact that Kosso explains how the idea of simplicity and the determination of what is simple and what is not is dependent upon cultural/linguistic/social understandings. I believe that is entirely true and irrefutable. However, my question with response to the idea of simplicity being a "Valuable feature" is: would simplicity really be valuable if we just taught people that complication and thinking complexly is not a bad thing? Really the idea that theories are more valuable when they are simple because they are easier to work with is just a reflection of the current value and expectation we have with time. If it's easier to work with, it takes less time, if it takes less time, we can accomplish" more" within a given amount of time. This then suggests that it is better to do more in less time than it is to do less with more time. Perhaps we only need to shift this understanding and let complexity have it's rightful place in our world and stop avoiding it. We need to realign our thinking with respect to time and just learn to take more time to do more things. Fast pace isn't the best. Simplicity is not objective.
"External values...indicate...that [a] theory...is accountable to observations." Again, this is another suggestion that testability is what makes a theory valuable with implications of constant uncertainty -- something I am very uncomfortable with. The external virtue of explanation is that "a good theory should be able to explain some observed phenomena." (pg. 47) It was somewhat difficult to explain how this virtue is distinguished from the internal virtue of explanatory cooperation. The second external value of testing and confirmation was also difficult for me to distinguish between the internal virtue of testability being that it indubitably elaborates on the notion of "counting" toward falsifiability (pg. 49).
And finally, we come to chapter three which is an attempt at elaborating on the external virtue of explanation. I would like to focus on the amendments made to the covering-law model being that Kosso suggested that his entire explanation of the covering-law was incomplete and thus needed to be amended. Particularly what caught my attention the most was when Kosso says, "[The accomplishment of understanding is] finding the most basic patterns in the events and structure of the world." This is totally indicative of an appreciation for the concept of efficiency and then using it as a standard for judgment of what warrants a good theory and a bad theory in explanation. As stated earlier, how can we finalize this account? As Kosso stated earlier, the explanation of a theory in "basic" form is almost entirely based on the cultural appreciation/description and use of language and measurement. Nonetheless I appreciate that he goes on to explain that the external feature of explanation of causal theories (answers to the why questions) are influenced by the internal concerns of a theory. It helped to clarify the distinction between the internal virtue of internal explanation and external explanation.
To conclude, I want to point out that Kosso finally supports my claim that living in a "Fallible" world would be disastrous. Just as my head continues to spin in trying to understand and come to grips with the circular logic of science philosophy, so I'm sure the world outside of academia would as well. As a connection to my claim about a world of fallibility living in elective modernism, on page 65 Kosso writes, "Successful explanation certainly does not guarantee that the explaining theory is true." Just because a theory explains a phenomena does not mean the explanation is really what causes the phenomena. But the sad part about all of this, as I stated earlier is (pg. 68) "It is hard to tell when we've got a genuinely causal explanation...explanation construed as identification of the cause is indicative of truth, but is too difficult to evaluate." It's circular logic because part of the whole POINT of the philosophy of science and determining "responsible" and "good" justification is a claims ability to be tested, i.e. evaluated. This is disastrous if we decide to live in a world with this kind of logic. It would make people's heads go in circles until finally exploding!
Saturday, April 18, 2009
Fact is Fact. Fiction is Fiction - Latour Chapter 1: Further Reflections
I find it strange that the "Argument from authority" notion is so prominent within a culture that so boldly claims rights to wof truth and the discovery of "Fact".
Latour's account of the dissenter having to confront the controversy upstream by addressing "authority", the referenced texts that support, negate, and transform any given claim and the texts that later support the references on the claim is truly fascinating. Honestly, it reveals that the expectation of "Rightness" or "Fact" is EXACTLY the same with science as it is all the rest of the world's disciplines of study. This expectation holds that a lot of people have to believe the claim in order for it to be true "...literature [becomes] more technical by bringing in more and more resources]". With that said, it reveals a deeper philosophical notion that majority belief establishes truth. The power of a statement in politics, in academia, in the social realm, AND in science rests in how many people believe. If more people believe the statement than those who do not, mostly it is considered a fact. The most common reasoning behind this philosophical holding is that "well there has to be some reason why so many people this to be true."
As a tangent, this brings about another foundational element of the strength of a claim. The tenure of a given statement is taken into great consideration when evaluating it's "rightness". The reasoning is, "Well since this statement has been so widely reported for so long it must hold some truth if it not completely true." Science follows these statements as well. Latour's explanation of "transformation" from artifact to a form of tacit knowledge falls in line with this foundational element.
Knowing that scientific claims and discovery are no different from other phenomena in the world, in terms of expectation and understanding is disheartening. Why? Because Science claims to discover fact thus suggesting that fact and truth are. Things that must be discovered -- not made true and untrue by supporting claims of comrades. I mean the notion of truth in existence is comparable to God's existence: God said, "I am that I am. Tell them that 'I am' sent you," when talking to Moses. The point being that even if people are in consent or dissent with God's existence does not change the fact that He exists. God just is and that's all there is to it despite supporting and/or negating arguments. Truth just is, it's not a matter of support or the lack thereof.
The fact that science claims to be able to discover this yet relies so heavily upon consent and/or dissent is hilarious and quite annoying really. The majority of people believed that the world was flat. The majority of scientists believed that physical appearance and structure contributed to the status and intelligence of people within a society. We all know these to not be true and even when people did believe these statements to be true they weren't.
I wish that science would admit that authority arguments, references, an widely held claims and statements do not make something fact or fiction. Fact is fact. Fiction is fiction whether people agree or do not agree. Fact is fact despite hostile environment. Fiction is fiction despite hostile environment. All this means is that less people believe a statement to be true. But whether it is true or not does not rest in the hands of the readers or hearers of the information. A statement's USE is dependent upon the agreement or lack thereof of readers and hearers of the information.
Latour's account of the dissenter having to confront the controversy upstream by addressing "authority", the referenced texts that support, negate, and transform any given claim and the texts that later support the references on the claim is truly fascinating. Honestly, it reveals that the expectation of "Rightness" or "Fact" is EXACTLY the same with science as it is all the rest of the world's disciplines of study. This expectation holds that a lot of people have to believe the claim in order for it to be true "...literature [becomes] more technical by bringing in more and more resources]". With that said, it reveals a deeper philosophical notion that majority belief establishes truth. The power of a statement in politics, in academia, in the social realm, AND in science rests in how many people believe. If more people believe the statement than those who do not, mostly it is considered a fact. The most common reasoning behind this philosophical holding is that "well there has to be some reason why so many people this to be true."
As a tangent, this brings about another foundational element of the strength of a claim. The tenure of a given statement is taken into great consideration when evaluating it's "rightness". The reasoning is, "Well since this statement has been so widely reported for so long it must hold some truth if it not completely true." Science follows these statements as well. Latour's explanation of "transformation" from artifact to a form of tacit knowledge falls in line with this foundational element.
Knowing that scientific claims and discovery are no different from other phenomena in the world, in terms of expectation and understanding is disheartening. Why? Because Science claims to discover fact thus suggesting that fact and truth are. Things that must be discovered -- not made true and untrue by supporting claims of comrades. I mean the notion of truth in existence is comparable to God's existence: God said, "I am that I am. Tell them that 'I am' sent you," when talking to Moses. The point being that even if people are in consent or dissent with God's existence does not change the fact that He exists. God just is and that's all there is to it despite supporting and/or negating arguments. Truth just is, it's not a matter of support or the lack thereof.
The fact that science claims to be able to discover this yet relies so heavily upon consent and/or dissent is hilarious and quite annoying really. The majority of people believed that the world was flat. The majority of scientists believed that physical appearance and structure contributed to the status and intelligence of people within a society. We all know these to not be true and even when people did believe these statements to be true they weren't.
I wish that science would admit that authority arguments, references, an widely held claims and statements do not make something fact or fiction. Fact is fact. Fiction is fiction whether people agree or do not agree. Fact is fact despite hostile environment. Fiction is fiction despite hostile environment. All this means is that less people believe a statement to be true. But whether it is true or not does not rest in the hands of the readers or hearers of the information. A statement's USE is dependent upon the agreement or lack thereof of readers and hearers of the information.
Monday, April 13, 2009
How does framing tie into Latour's "web-worky" emphasis?
The most important aspects of what N & M mean by framing science is the aspect of relevance and the availability of information and the level at which it is understood by different receivers of scientific information. N&M argue that the information being given to one who is outside of the realm of science must be able to find how it relates to them in order to find it important and give the information their time and attention. It also has to be available to outsiders in a particularly attractive manner and be at a level in which it can be easily understood. The scientific community must take on the responsibility of sharing pertinent information with the public and this duty requires attention to how the information is conveyed.
The relationship I see between framing and Latour’s argument is simply located in the fact that scientific information is interconnected with the world around it in many different realms – political, social, economical, moral, philosophical, and even daily life. Taking this into consideration, it is then extremely important that people hear/see this information, want to see and hear it, understand it, and understand how it relates to them in a way that is beneficial with respect to these different areas of human life. If scientific information is merely “Technical” and “objective” – which it is not – then only people who are interested in objectivity and technology are going to be interested in the information offered to them. However, as Latour argues, scientific information plays an important role in our society, so much so that common people need to know what’s going on and how it affects their lives. With this burden put on the scientific community – they must answer. They must act and do as media does (perhaps) and frame this important information in a way that is catchy and demonstrates its important in the lives of the non-scientific human.
The relationship I see between framing and Latour’s argument is simply located in the fact that scientific information is interconnected with the world around it in many different realms – political, social, economical, moral, philosophical, and even daily life. Taking this into consideration, it is then extremely important that people hear/see this information, want to see and hear it, understand it, and understand how it relates to them in a way that is beneficial with respect to these different areas of human life. If scientific information is merely “Technical” and “objective” – which it is not – then only people who are interested in objectivity and technology are going to be interested in the information offered to them. However, as Latour argues, scientific information plays an important role in our society, so much so that common people need to know what’s going on and how it affects their lives. With this burden put on the scientific community – they must answer. They must act and do as media does (perhaps) and frame this important information in a way that is catchy and demonstrates its important in the lives of the non-scientific human.
Wednesday, April 8, 2009
The Implications of Elective Modernism - Week 2: Blog 1
Expertise, as Collins claims, is a much softer standard utilized for judgment. Instead of embracing a standard to find and publicize absolute truth – used to justify skepticism – the standard of expertise provides a different sort of fundamental framework through which elective modernism can function in its essential nature and thus deter divisions among the knowledgeable and general populous. Living in an elective modernist, scientific yet socially scientific world - where sociologists and natural scientists work together - would be ideal for society as we would employ a standard of expertise and standard of possible fallibility.
The implications of such a society are disastrous. As one who is particularly interested in human behavior, I have found a very common thread in human behavior and need (sociologists would claim this as well) -- a desire for solid truth; for things to be as they are and without doubt. These are mostly phenomena that are able to be seen by the human eye, however another common thread of humanity is that we know that just because we don't see something does not indicate the lack of existence. Rather, the unseen invokes a curiosity to be able to see or understand that which is not able to be seen. Living in a world where fallibility is suggested in every area and aspect of existence, standard of life, and living is completely contrary to this important characteristic of human behavior. It would invoke a world of chaos. It would invoke a world of indecisiveness (which is commonly associated with psychological disorder(s)) and ultimately we would get nothing done because we would not be able to trust anything we see or hear as we are taught to consider the fallibility of everything.
What Collins does not understand is that the scientific community and rules for existence are only able to be handled by certain people. Everyone can not live in a society such as this and should not have to. People believing in something wholeheartedly is a necessary contribution to society. People whoa re constantly skeptical or always considering fallibility are also a contribution to society. We need both. Instead of moving to this extreme, we must embrace the differences and realize the use of them all.
Perhaps I could be wrong. I highly doubt it, but my claim is worth consideration. Perhaps it is a little on the negative side -- but it could be true.
The implications of such a society are disastrous. As one who is particularly interested in human behavior, I have found a very common thread in human behavior and need (sociologists would claim this as well) -- a desire for solid truth; for things to be as they are and without doubt. These are mostly phenomena that are able to be seen by the human eye, however another common thread of humanity is that we know that just because we don't see something does not indicate the lack of existence. Rather, the unseen invokes a curiosity to be able to see or understand that which is not able to be seen. Living in a world where fallibility is suggested in every area and aspect of existence, standard of life, and living is completely contrary to this important characteristic of human behavior. It would invoke a world of chaos. It would invoke a world of indecisiveness (which is commonly associated with psychological disorder(s)) and ultimately we would get nothing done because we would not be able to trust anything we see or hear as we are taught to consider the fallibility of everything.
What Collins does not understand is that the scientific community and rules for existence are only able to be handled by certain people. Everyone can not live in a society such as this and should not have to. People believing in something wholeheartedly is a necessary contribution to society. People whoa re constantly skeptical or always considering fallibility are also a contribution to society. We need both. Instead of moving to this extreme, we must embrace the differences and realize the use of them all.
Perhaps I could be wrong. I highly doubt it, but my claim is worth consideration. Perhaps it is a little on the negative side -- but it could be true.
Saturday, April 4, 2009
The Power of Language - Week 1: Blog 2
"We Have Never Been Modern" - Chapter 1: Crisis
The power of language is amazing. The significant impact of one word or the arrangement of several and.or many words can alter one’s reality; perhaps shift foundational understandings of one’s reality. Consider the following statements:
“I like you” vs. “I love you”
The first implies a notion of favor toward another in the sense of a platonic (or leading to a romantic or somewhat familial) relationship. The second statement implies a deeper intimacy from whence one can employ certain expectations, communication patterns/habits, and behaviors. A married couple actively expressing their love will certainly act differently toward and speak differently to one another than two people recently befriended to each other. The married couple's and the friends' foundational understandings of each others' relationships are going to be entirely different and thus generate entirely different behaviors.
Latour’s use of the word crisis to speak on the problem of academia’s disciplines of study being segmented is thus purposefully used to accomplish several feats. The first, I believe, is to make his readers aware of how significant the problem is. The word crisis is generally used to depict a situation that is very unstable and/or is very tense. It employs a very negative connotation. Usually when one hears the word “crisis” the response is to automatically ask oneself “how can it be prevented?” if it is used to speak of an approaching condition – or “how can this be fixed?” For example, someone facing a mid-life crisis is said to be experiencing a dramatic turning point. Here this person is said to suddenly recognize that what he or she has been doing has not been fulfilling but instead has been useless in sustaining a worthwhile and satisfying life. This is, obviously, VERY disheartening. It is no accident then that Latour uses “crisis” because he is implying that we need to turn away from the current understanding in academia and the world because it has not been useful.
The second reason he uses the word crisis, I believe, is to stimulate human response. As stated previously, when someone says a crisis is imminent, people react in a way that will hopefully deter such an occasion. I believe that Latour is trying to move people to understand his idea that we are in a state of emergency and thus stimulate human response to stabilize the academic condition. Segmentation of academic disciplines is not very stable being that – naturally – everything is connected and plays a part in the existence of each.
The power of language is amazing. The significant impact of one word or the arrangement of several and.or many words can alter one’s reality; perhaps shift foundational understandings of one’s reality. Consider the following statements:
“I like you” vs. “I love you”
The first implies a notion of favor toward another in the sense of a platonic (or leading to a romantic or somewhat familial) relationship. The second statement implies a deeper intimacy from whence one can employ certain expectations, communication patterns/habits, and behaviors. A married couple actively expressing their love will certainly act differently toward and speak differently to one another than two people recently befriended to each other. The married couple's and the friends' foundational understandings of each others' relationships are going to be entirely different and thus generate entirely different behaviors.
Latour’s use of the word crisis to speak on the problem of academia’s disciplines of study being segmented is thus purposefully used to accomplish several feats. The first, I believe, is to make his readers aware of how significant the problem is. The word crisis is generally used to depict a situation that is very unstable and/or is very tense. It employs a very negative connotation. Usually when one hears the word “crisis” the response is to automatically ask oneself “how can it be prevented?” if it is used to speak of an approaching condition – or “how can this be fixed?” For example, someone facing a mid-life crisis is said to be experiencing a dramatic turning point. Here this person is said to suddenly recognize that what he or she has been doing has not been fulfilling but instead has been useless in sustaining a worthwhile and satisfying life. This is, obviously, VERY disheartening. It is no accident then that Latour uses “crisis” because he is implying that we need to turn away from the current understanding in academia and the world because it has not been useful.
The second reason he uses the word crisis, I believe, is to stimulate human response. As stated previously, when someone says a crisis is imminent, people react in a way that will hopefully deter such an occasion. I believe that Latour is trying to move people to understand his idea that we are in a state of emergency and thus stimulate human response to stabilize the academic condition. Segmentation of academic disciplines is not very stable being that – naturally – everything is connected and plays a part in the existence of each.
Friday, April 3, 2009
Perhaps, persuasion, and possibility: The Truth of Science– Week 1 – Blog 1
“The machine will work when all the relevant people are convinced.” (pg. 12 – Science in Action)
Immediately this statement struck me with the utmost force. I thought, “How dare she say that! Just because something in science is ‘true’ does not necessarily mean it is ‘true’! Science/the scientific community is comprised of human beings capable of mistakes and human beings that are, oftentimes, simultaneously linked to agendas (political, philosophical, moral, societal, doctrinal, etc.) and people (i.e. networks/webworks) who want to further or are considering furthering those agendas. This is not to mention the fact that scientific evidence can be used/manipulated/explained in a way that supports certain political, philosophical, moral, societal, and doctrinal views. When it comes down to it – based on the current paradigm of academia (I simplify it as ‘take everything as a grain of salt and think about it’) there is no such thing as objectivity which thus determines truth. All points of view – including academic/scientific views possess a foundational agenda – consciously stated or unconsciously upheld.” No I didn’t think of all that at that specific moment, these words came after years of continuous contemplation on this very matter. Nonetheless, during these contemplations I often felt like an outsider thinking the way that I thought about academic/scientific views, discoveries, and claims. One can only imagine my reaction when I read the introduction to Latour’s book.
Latour is onto something that I know (if taken seriously and given as much attention as contradicting views) is going to rattle the foundations of academia. For some reason it is extremely difficult to locate people in this world (especially in “open-minded” academia) to understand that scientific theories are just that – theories. Involved in formulating and “solidifying” these theories is a process that can be wrong or not all the way understood. Science cannot claim to just “be”. Findings have the possibility of being correct. But in order to achieve the status of being widely accepted as truth, it involves a process of persuading others/colleagues (preferably authorities in the field) to join a particular side which will serve to support that the claim is correct (I won’t even touch on the area of persuasion). Yet we know claims can be wrong from time to time as can authorities (pg. 6 – Science in Action) so just because a vast majority agrees on something doesn’t necessarily make it true. Perhaps it is, perhaps it is not.
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